Introduction
Latin Americanists have become increasingly intrigued with questions concerning rural labour and oppression. In recent publicadons, traditional interpretations of peonage, labour contracting, wage labour and other topics have been questioned by historians with access to new documentary materials. Peru has been the setting for much of this discussion because of the important changes which occurred during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the unusual opportunity to understand them since the creation of the Archivo del Fuero Agrario. 1 Much of the interest in Peru has centered on the expansion of the sugar industry and the efforts of sugar planters to reach out into the highlands to acquire labourers from among peasant communities. This process has been referred to as enganche, from the verb enganchar, meaning to hook or to entrap. A t the time, it evoked the wrath of the pro-Indian intelligentsia who wrote exposes condemning the system as little better than slavery.
2 While their heart was in the right place, these writers did not have the detachment, access to documentary materials nor the advantage of historical perspective to write completely accurate and unbiased accounts. Nevertheless, until recently they were the principal sources for studying enganche. This is reflected in the early work of Peter F. Klaren and others where unsuspecting highlanders are tricked and exploited at every turn by un-scrupulous labour contractors and hacendados. As in the Indianist tracts of the early twentieth century, deception, violence and indebted peonage are emphasized as the methods used to get peons down to the coast and to keep them there. 3 With the availability of estate and contractor letter files, how ever, a different picture of enganche is emerging. Klaren, for example, after reading some of the new materials, modified his interpretadon to argue that coercion and peonage were paramount only during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, after which monetary reward was the principal mechanism behind enganche.*
In a revisionist essay, Arnold J. Bauer recently reviewed much of the recent literature which utilizes heretofore unavailable hacienda records. Bauer devotes considerable space to Peru and the topic of enganche, although the bulk of the new research in this area is only now appearing in print. Bauer argues that, because of competition for labour, contractors had to offer peons good wages and working conditions, which were readily accepted. If indebted peonage and force were ever utilized, they apparendy were never important variables in labour contracting. 5 Bauer's article has elicited a vigorous rebuttal from Brian Loveman who criticizes him for over-generalizing and ignoring older studies which docu ment cases of worker abuse. For the northern coast of Peru, Loveman also cites a recent study which shows a more complex picture of labour contracting and worker-planter relations. 0 What follows is an attempt to shed light on this controversial topic. To do so, I have consulted new primary source materials and placed the problem more within the context of economic change, both on the regional and international levels, and evolving methods of social and political control. My findings lead me to argue that the genesis of enganche, the crucial transi tion period from 1880 to 1905, combined elements of coercion and violence with capital incentives from the onset.
The development of enganche reflected the linkage of the expanding export sector on the coast, which had available large amounts of capital, with the largely subsistence economy of the northern sierra where demographic and economic pressures made migration attractive. Thus, sugar planters could generally control the flow of migration to their plantations through offering cash advances and wages to labour contractors and peasants. However, this did not preclude contractors from resorting to duplicity and coercion to meet labour quotas when necessary.
Planters gauged their labour needs primarily on the basis of production schedules. Ideally, they sought to maximize production at all times but could not always afford to do so. During these years, their principal barometer for investment in labour was the prevailing price of sugar on the world market. This was not necessarily a precise calculation but rather a guideline to anticipated profits.
Those peasants who responded voluntarily to work on the coast were attracted by the relatively high wages paid on the plantations. They migrated at first to earn spot incomes during slack periods in the agricultural cycle back home, but gradually chose to maximize their incomes by remaining on the coast for longer periods of time. Indebted workers who wanted to return home, however, were often forced to remain behind until their debts had been repaid.
Indebted bondage arose from the specific labour needs of the sugar cane plantations. Because these plantations relied on irrigation as opposed to seasonal rainfall, they planted and harvested almost year round. This made it imperative to have a stable work force, and compelled planters, especially during periods of labour scarcity, to attempt to hold on to indebted workers. However, on the northern coast peonage did not work as efficiently as it is generally portrayed in the literature.
Historical and geographical background
By the late nineteenth century, sugar production was becoming increas ingly concentrated in the northern departments of La Libertad and Lambayeque. This reflected ecological advantages, particularly superior soils and more hours of intense sunlight which matured the cane more rapidly, as well as the dynamic leadership of a new group of planters with access to large amounts of capital. The largest plantations were located in four valleys, the Moche (or Santa Catalina), Chicama, Sana and Lambayeque, which were irrigated by Andean rivers. The regions in between the valleys were virtually uncultivated owing to the almost total lack of rainfall on the coast. The principal problems facing the sugar industry during the late nine teenth century were low sugar prices and labour shortages. The price of sugar began to fall in the 1870s and continued downwards, with an occasional upswing, into the twentieth century. This was the result of supply outstrip-
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ping demand as beet sugar was introduced on to the world market at the same time that cane growers were increasing production.
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Sugar cane plantations on the Peruvian coast, as elsewhere in the Americas, had relied upon black slavery since the sixteenth century. When abolition finally came to Peru in 1854, planters utilized the indemnification they received from the government for the loss of their slaves to import over 100,000 Chinese indentured servants. The Chinese remained the mainstay of coastal agriculture until 1874 when the British and Chinese governments combined to bring a halt to the coolie trade. Planters attempted to combat the ensuing labour shortage as well as low sugar prices by carrying out a series of technological improvements designed to eliminate jobs and increase production. The principal improvements con sisted of mill modernization, installation of portable railroads to carry cane to the mill, construction of railroad lines connecting plantations with coastal ports and heavier reliance on steam powered tractors. 10 Initially, planters did not seriously consider converting to Peruvian wage labour because the change-over would be expensive and risky, particularly during the chaotic years during and immediately after the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). The decision to recruit local peasants finally came as the result of the growing unproductivity of the Chinese and improving economic and political conditions which favoured increased investment in labour.
This can be seen through the experience of the sugar cane plantation Cayalti. One of roughly a dozen plantations which produced the bulk of Peruvian sugar, Cayalti spanned over 77,000 acres in the heart of the Sana Valley. The estate was an important sugar producer as early as 1622 and it is one of the principal co-operatives on the north coast today. The history of the estate in the modern period is tied to the Aspillaga family which used its sugar fortune to rise to a position of social and political prominence. The Aspillagas purchased the estate in 1859 and managed it throughout the period under consideration here. The Aspillagas viewed the end to the coolie trade with great alarm writing that the Chinese are ' . . . everything to our agriculture and the best labourers who we can obtain,' and beseeching the Lord to allow immigration to continue.
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Although their prayers were not answered, the Aspillagas con tinued to believe that new sources of servile labour could be located. In the meantime, they held on to their aging Chinese workers, sometimes resorting to indebted peonage and force. The Chinese, however, were becoming in creasingly unproductive. For example, in June, 1891 the Aspillagas described 300 of their 420 Chinese workers as ' . . . old and tired men.. . .' They wrote that absenteeism was such a serious problem, especially on Mondays, that milling sometimes had to be stopped, and those Chinese who did work were only capable of handling skilled jobs, such as operating machinery.
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The conclusion was inescapable that an alternative source of labour had to be found. Although this would be costly and uncertain, planters were en couraged by indications that the national economy and polity were stabilizing after years of anarchy. In particular, foreign credit was becoming increasingly available and a new oligarchy was forming around the Civilista Party in which sugar planters assumed a prominent role. 
Labour supply
Coast
The commitment to labour contracting in the highlands was made by the Aspillagas in the late 1880s. But before then they had cautiously begun to recruit peasant labour from nearby towns and native communities on the coast. Coastal workers had worked from time to time at Cayalti in the past, usually on irrigation canals. Now Cayalti hoped to recruit large numbers of costenos, especially from the neighbouring town of Sana, to work at all jobs. As early as 1879, the Aspillagas had cast an envious eye toward that small community.
The peons and Chinos Libres are behaving well and little by little their numbers will increase -[but] what we want is for all of the Saneros to become our peons since they are the most secure and best suited for us because they are the closest.
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Despite their economic and political influence, however, the Aspillagas were never able to recruit as many Saneros as they desired. As far as can be determined, the largest number of Saneros to work at Cayalti was 100 in 1923, or 4.6 percent of the entire work force. Saneros stayed away from Cayalti for several reasons. Not only were they angry with the Aspillagas for having stolen much of their land, but they preferred to work on rice estates where the pay was higher and the work more to their liking.
1 6 In general, they tended to move from estate to estate, rarely working in any one place for a long period of time. In fact, it was usually only during floods and other calamitous times that relatively large numbers of costefios could be found at Cayalti. The Aspillagas commented on coastal workers in 1889 as follows:
Those from the coast, or zambos [persons of mixed black and Indian blood], are scarce and the Saneros, if you could round up 100 or so of them, we could not acclimatise them in any manner whatsoever, because the majority of them are lazy men who go around looking for a new patron every week, that is to say, looking for where they can do less. We need then authorization to send con tractors from the interior and from the coast, who will always be preferable for making loans with their own capital.. . . Presendy, with the rice harvest, the work force on the large [sugar] estates always diminishes because of the attraction that this work has for them, but happily this is already passing.
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It seems likely that other north coast sugar plantations had similar experi ences with costefios. For example, the estate Pomalca in the Lambayeque Valley occasionally used coastal labour but the majority of its workers were non-costeiios. 18 Peter Klaren argues in his book that many of the small farmers who sold out to the plantation Casa Grande in the Chicama Valley eventually came to work for that estate. He does not determine, however, whether or not they became resident workers, which is an important distinc tion. There is another, more fundamental, reason why costenos could have never constituted a majority of workers on coastal estates; namely, the north coast was too thinly populated to supply the thousands of workers sugar plantations required. This problem had existed since the Spanish conquest which had decimated the native population on the coast and forced planters to import black slaves.
21
Japan By the turn of the present century, planters had focused their attention on two new sources of labour: Japanese contract labourers and Peruvian peasants from the neighbouring highlands. Japanese immigration, how ever, proved to be a disappointment to both planters and immigrants. In the first place, only 17,764 Japanese entered Peru between 1898 and 1923, which was far short of the number needed. Furthermore, many immigrants quickly left Peru on their own accord or were expelled by planters. The problem actually began in Japan where emigration companies painted a pleasant picture of Peruvian plantation life. Once in Peru, the Japanese soon discovered that the coast was hot and unhealthy, and that planters often times refused to pay stipulated wages and even subjected workers to corporal punishment. For planters there soon developed a problem over wages because Japanese workers, according to their contracts, received a daily wage while Peruvian and Chinese workers were paid by piece work. In almost all cases, the Japanese ended up being paid more for less work.
At Cayalti, the Japanese had a minimal impact, as only fifty workers were contracted and they lasted but two months. Neighbouring estates ordered more Japanese than Cayalti but the results were equally disappointing. Only in the Departments of Lima and Cafiete, on the central and southern coasts, did sugar plantations receive long-term benefits from Japanese immi gration. resort, as the few serranos who they had employed in the past had either quickly fallen ill or had returned home after only a short stay.
2 3 Now, how ever, they had little choice but to attempt to mobilize large numbers of highlanders in order to save their industry.
As it turned out, serranos had several reasons for wanting to migrate. The northern sierra was relatively populous, economically underdeveloped, and plagued by banditry, while the plantations paid good wages. The popula tion of the northern highlands was predominandy rural, congregated into towns, villages, native communities, and haciendas. In 1876 the Department of Cajamarca had a population of 213,000, while the highlands of the Department of La Libertad contained 119,500 inhabitants. The Province of Chota in Cajamarca, which became a centre for labour contracting, had a population of 51,000, only 11,000 less than the entire north coast, including urban areas. Moreover, according to the Census of 1876, two-thirds of the inhabitants of the northern sierra were either white or mestizo, so that the coast was not as culturally alien to them as it was to the Indians of the central and southern sierra. 24 The northern sierra was not a particularly prosperous region. The economy was predominandy agricultural and pastoral, except for some isolated mining activity in Hualgayoc (coal) and Pataz (gold). Cajamarquenos produced wheat, wool, sheep, mules, and minerals which they sold in adjacent towns and villages as well as in the Amazon Basin and on the coast. Revenues earned were primarily spent on the coast for cotton, sugar, salt, clothing, and mining equipment. In 1855, ^s exchange, owing largely to the value of minerals, netted Cajamarquenos a surplus of 175,325 pesos. 25 Nevertheless, the majority of peasants did not share in this modest profit. For them, the key to prosperity was access to land, and this was a region of latifundia and minifundia. Thus, in 1903, Pelayo Puga, whose family owned a 737,000 acre estate in Cajamarca, wrote that land was either owned by huge haciendas or divided into extremely small plots. And even today Cajamarquenos recall that the problem of latifundia-minifundia was a key reason why their ancestors migrated to the coast. 26 Moreover, because of poor soils, ownership of two or three plots of land might not guarantee prosperity. For example, Baldomero Aspillaga Barrera observed in 1892 that the land scape of the Province of Hualgayoc, an area of recruitment by Cayalti, was either very hilly or barren fladand. He also noted that the coal industry in the region was already in decline, and this must have deprived many people of a livelihood. 27 Furthermore, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the lives and property of serranos were threatened by endemic banditry. For example, in 1902 the Sub-Prefect of Huamachuco, an area of heavy recruitment by estates in the Chicama and Santa Catalina Valleys, wrote to the Prefect, complaining that armed bands roamed the countryside, committing the worst possible crimes. He stated that in the Districts of Marcabal and Sarin towns were filled with 'thieves and assassins' who carried firearms in public, and he ended by pleading with the Prefect to create two new rural police stations.
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In a similar vein, several citizens from Cutervo, a recruitment area frequendy exploited by estates from the Lambayeque Valley and occasionally by Cayalti, asked the central government in 1904 to create a new province for the sole purpose of controlling banditry. They wrote that the area was dominated by private armies which included bandits from Ecuador, Piura and Amazonas. Moreover, in Chota, people today remember that the prevalence of catde rusding was another reason why their ancestors migrated. 29 For all these reasons, therefore, serranos sought a better life on the coast. There, on sugar plantations they could earn a cash wage far superior to any paid in the sierra, except in a few mining areas.
For serranos to replace Chinese, however, required a herculean effort. Thousands of peasants would have to be mobilized, transported to the coast in organized contingents, and preferably made to stay for long periods of time. By themselves, planters may have found this to have been an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task. Here, they were fortunate to acquire the services of labour contractors, or enganchadores, who largely succeeded in meeting their needs. Most labour contractors were serranos, and for logical reasons. Enganchadores had to be intimately familiar with the locales where they contracted, as only residents could be, and it was important that they be men of local influence, persons with access to labour and capital. Thus, it is not surprising that most enganchadores were either prosperous serrano merchants or hacendados.
Serrano merchants, of course, had had contact with the coast for some time, buying and selling the products mentioned above. It is only logical, therefore, that they would have been familiar with the needs of coastal plantations and willing to become contractors to make more money. Besides, the more important contractors were allowed to operate stores on the planta tions, stocked with their own merchandise. This was an excellent business opportunity.
Several enganchadores are specifically identified as either hacendados or merchants in the surviving records of north coast sugar plantations. For example, when Baldomero Aspillaga Barrera visited Cayalti's principal con tractor, Jose -Santos Medina Cedron, in February, 1892 he described him as the most important merchant in Bambamarca, and a very prestigious person within the community. Pomalca's principal contractor from 1900 to 1933, Eduardo Tiravante, owned at least two haciendas in the Province of Chota, Churucancha and Mollebamba. Likewise, Daniel Orrego, who con tracted for both Pomalca and Cayalti in the Province of Santa Cruz, was a merchant-hacendado who at one point was governor of the province. Similarly, a woman contractor at Laredo in the Santa Catalina Valley, Matilde Martin Vda. de Pinillos, held usufruct over the estate Chusgon, which in 1913 extended over 295,000 acres and was home for 2,826 persons.
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Contractors tended to be persons of substance because position and wealth facilitated labour recruitment. A big merchant like Jose Santos Medina Cedron, for example, sold goods on credit to local peasants who agreed to discount their debt by working at Cayalti. In this fashion, Medina Cedron not only made a profit on sales but earned a commission from the Aspillagas, based on the amount of work done by peons under his contract.
31 Owners and renters of haciendas, moreover, regularly supplied plantations with peons from their estates. Thus in May, 1897 an Aspillaga wrote: 'The peons from Chota can only be contracted by gamonales from the area [as] they know and understand its complexities.. . . ' 3 2 Earlier, the Aspillagas had agreed to help Medina Cedron lease the Hacienda del Colegio in Chota because they felt that it would allow him to supply Cayalti with 100 more peons. Moreover, enganche contracts signed between Pomalca and Eduardo Tiravante generally stipulated that he supply from 200 to 250 peons from one or more of his estates in Chota. It is also significant that the only contractor found to recruit exclusively on the coast, Miguel Arbulu Gonzales, rented small to medium sized estates in Lambayeque. Contractors who either owned or rented haciendas were able to force tenants and sub-tenants to fulfill rent obligations by working on the coast. This is documented for the estate Yaucan and for the haciendas studied by Solomon Miller in the highlands of La Libertad. 34 Nevertheless, enganchadores did not always have to resort to such tactics to recruit labour. In many cases, peons voluntarily agreed to work on the coast, owing to the economic and demographic pressures mentioned earlier.
Peasants would either present themselves at a contractor's office or sign a contract while drunk at a fiesta. The latter practice was so common that planters helped contractors purchase alcohol for the occasions, and counted on receiving new recruits following major holidays. Planters, for their part, preferred to deal with contractors who were merchants or merchant-hacendados. There were two basic reasons for this: this type of contractor could deliver more peons, and he was less of a financial risk. For example, at Pomalca contractors generally guaranteed repayment of all advances received from planters against seizure of their property in the sierra. Labor recruitment involved the signing of two contracts: one between plantation and contractor and another between contractor and peon. Peons received a cash advance from contractors, varying between 10 and 50 soles, which they agreed to repay with their labour on the coast. Peons might also agree to work off previous debts or rent. T o assure repayment, the peon and a co-signer put up as collateral their possessions and labour, and surrendered all rights to contest the contract in court. Peons also agreed to work a certain number of days, typically ninety, in case they repaid their loans very quickly. Although it was unstated in the contract, peons discounted their debt in voluntarily. Thus, each pay-day either the contractor or the estate, depending on the source of capital for the loan, received the peon's wage (except for a small amount, generally 10 centavos) until the loan was repaid. Peons did not starve because they received a daily ration. 38 Planters attempted to control labour supply, in part, through contracts with enganchadores.
These agreements obligated contractors to supply a number of peons within a certain period of time (usually one to two months) to work at whatever job the estate desired. Planters generally advanced con tractors enough money (usually by cheque) to cover the cost of loans to peons. To assure repayment, contractors sometimes put up as collateral property in the sierra, usually an estate or a business. Finally, enganchadores were granted a percentage of the total amount of wages earned by their peons as a com mission. A commission of 20 percent was common, although it fluctuated. 
Demand for labour
The preceding discusion has presented the sierra, or supply side, of labour contracting. What remains to be analysed is the plantation, or demand side, of the process. Here Cayalti represents an example of a modernizing estate with basic similarities with other north coast plantations. Enganche viewed from Cayalti shows that labour contracting was a relatively efficient system which responded to capital. Thus, planters could determine the flow of labour, under normal market conditions, through the flow of money to enganchadores. Ultimately, the price of sugar determined how much capital the Aspillagas were willing to allocate for enganche and how many peons they could pay, although unforeseen events, such as wars and droughts, occasionally disrupted established patterns of supply.
The Aspillagas' first serious experience with enganche began in September, 1878. This first encounter, however, proved to be so disappointing that they adopted a policy of restraint and caution over the next few years which prevented the large scale recruitment of serranos. The cause for the initiation of labour contracting was a severe labour shortage caused by the construction of a new mill, which took men out of their regular jobs, and the end to Chinese immigration. The Aspillagas negotiated with an enganchador to transfer 50 serranos from a neighbouring estate, and advanced him an additional S/. 1,300 to contract more workers. A t the same time, they forwarded S/.400 to another contractor to find more workers for Cayalti. Within a month, however, all but a few of the serranos had repaid their loans and returned to the sierra, and no new workers had arrived to take their place. 41 After this disappointing experience, the Aspillagas were very reluctant to advance money to contractors and to pay them standard commissions. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that very few serranos were contracted to work at Cayalti. 4 2 The Aspillagas' first real success with enganche came in 1886 when they signed an agreement with Medina Cedr6n of Bambamarca, who agreed to contract peons without receiving advances. This he could do by allowing peasants who had purchased goods on credit at his store to work off their debts on the coast. Medina Cedron was successful in part because Bambamarca had recovered much more rapidly from the war than had neighbouring areas, which aided his store and, consequendy, At that juncture, the Aspillagas were enthusiastic about the future of enganche,
since Medina Cedron accepted all financial risks and serranos had proved themselves to be good workers.
4 4 Besides, the Aspillagas had no choice but to continue contracting serranos, as each year the Chinese population grew smaller and less capable of manning the development of Cayalti. As a result, management decided to liberalize its policy on advances and to broaden the scope of labour contracting to include other parts of the sierra. Thus, at the Aspillagas' urging, Medina Cedron signed a new contract agree ing to contract in Chota and to supply Cayalti with a minimum of 200 peons. T o assist him, the Aspillagas agreed to pay 25 percent of all advances and to help him gain the lease to the Hacienda del Colegio.^ These measures were successful in part because of changing conditions in the sierra. Perhaps most significantly, by the end of the decade more merchants, hacendados and peasants were aware of the benefits of enganche. Moreover, the chaotic conditions of the war years in Chota were now quieted; and the mining industry in Bambabarca, which had taken labour away from the coast, was now declining. Thus, by May, 1890, the serrano population at Cayalti, composed mostly of people from Bambamarca, had grown to over 23o. 4 a There was, however, a definite seasonality to labour supply at Cayalti during the 1880s, evolving around climate and planting seasons in the sierra. Peons tended to repay their loans in time to return home by September or October to plant crops before the first rains. Thereafter, many peons would return to the plantations as early as November but would tend to leave again by February or March, which were the hottest months on the coast and coincided with a second planting season in the sierra. 47 The 1890s witnessed a movement away from this pattern as serranos began to be re-contracted on the estate, which led to the formation of a more permanent work force, and new contracts were signed with enganchadores in Bambamarca, Santa Cruz and Sorochuco. As a result, the number of serranos at Cayalti increased from 500 in 1895 to 900 by the turn of the century. 48 As all north coast sugar cane plantations converted to serrano labour, enganche became a more competitive business, driving wages and contractors' commissions upwards. This was a serious problem for the Aspillagas, and presumably other planters, because the price of sugar throughout the decade was dangerously low. The Aspillagas were caught between their growing inability to pay higher wages and the growing demands of contractors to raise wages and commissions. The situation came to a head in 1897 when the price of sugar hit a new low, and contractors began withdrawing workers to other estates which were paying higher wages and commissions. For the time being, the Aspillagas allowed the work force to diminish, taking solace in the fact that this also reduced expenditures during a time of shrinking profits. But when the price of sugar rose modestly two years later, management con sented to an increase in wages and commissions, and there quickly followed an increase in the size of the work force.
A similar situation occurred in 1902 when the price of sugar set another record low, causing a reduction in wages as well as the outright dismissal of several hundred workers. Nevertheless, once the price of sugar had risen far enough in management's judgment to justify increases in wages and com missions, hundreds of new workers appeared. Despite these periodic turnovers in the work force, a core of several hundred workers was required to keep the plantation running at all times. Among these workers there was a growing tendency to remain on the estate for longer periods of time. For example, in May of 1899 an Aspillaga wrote:
The contractor Negrete, who has the most peons [400 in 1905], only occasionally receives a peon from his associate Zarate in the sierra. All of his peons, one can say, are contracted here, so that they have a constant body of workers [una peonada constante] . . . 5 0 This, in turn, had a dramatic social impact on Cayalti, as a community of serranos was transferred to the coast.
. . . we now have many peons from Celedin with the advantage that they have a temperament very similar to coastal dwellers and they become acclimatised more easily than others, although it is true that those from Bambamarca could not have become better acclimatised. We have here a true community from Bambamarca, people who have been accustomed [to Cayalti] in such a way that they do not move from here. [Moreover] . . .all come with their families.... Many of these workers clearly chose to remain longer, attracted by the good wages and the availability of credit in the form of advances on wages from contractors and the estate. This is shown by the fact that hundreds of workers were signing new contracts on the estate and establishing households there. The Aspillagas and contractors had sought the formation of a more per manent work force for obvious reasons. For the Aspillagas, permanency guaranteed an adequate number of workers to maintain desired production levels, while for contractors, re-signing workers on the estate reduced the number of recruiting trips and capital ouday, as initial advances were tradi tionally larger than supplemental loans. In addition to relatively good wages, which included daily rations of meat and rice, the Aspillagas enticed workers to remain by constructing better housing to supplement the dilapidated barracks (galpones) used to house the Chinese. The best of these new homes were given to workers with families because they remained the longest. Permanency is a much more complicated question than this, however, because many other workers were forced to remain on the estate undl they had repaid outstanding debts. Such compulsion has been referred to as in debted peonage. Indebted peonage was used by Cayalti to hold on to Chinese workers, and by hacendados throughout Latin America since the Colonial Period. In recent publications, however, it has been argued that the inci dence of indebted peonage and oppression has been greatly exaggerated, and that peasants, more often than not, freely sold their labour in an open mar ket.
5 3 The discussion can perhaps be advanced by looking more closely at the demand for labour in the context of economic structure, political economy and social control.
T o control their Chinese workers, the Aspillagas and other sugar planters had relied upon violence and indebted peonage, and they continued to use these methods with Peruvian peons. Planters could generally count on the support of local officials, who sometimes doubled as labour contractors. Moreover, the central government (in which sugar planters participated) condoned enganche and even used it on occasion for large construction projects in the sierra. 54 However, no administration was likely to allow planters to intimidate Peruvian peons the way they did the Chinese, who were even subjected to torture and execution. 55 Furthermore, the national government was never involved in the large scale recruitment and transporta tion of peons to plantations, as was the Diaz regime in Mexico, 5 0 and peons sometimes benefited from squabbling between local officials and planters. Highlanders also had more options than the Chinese because of their greater physical mobility and the increasing demand for their labour. Forcing indebted workers to remain on the estate was of questionable legality. But there is also a point of legality here with respect to peons. They guaranteed repayment of their loans from contractors, and those who defaulted somedmes had their property (or that of a co-signer) confiscated. 59 The Aspillagas, however, did not require promissory notes, preferring to pressure contractors to get their money back for them, and to organize posses to hunt down debtors who had fled the estate. More will be said about this later.
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After they began work on Cayalti, many workers accumulated substantial debts, up to S/.100 and more, and then found it difficult to repay such large sums.
6 1 One principal reason for this was that many workers could not work a full work week. New workers in particular found it difficult to adjust to a regimented work routine and to the hot coastal climate. Moreover, there was always a large number of ill workers, the result of the presence of a variety of communicable diseases (including malaria, yellow fever, tuberculosis, influenza, and bubonic plague), and the Aspillagas' failure to provide adequate medical care. 0 2 Indebted peonage, of course, benefited the Aspillagas most during periods of labour shortages. For example, in March 1891, a larger than usual work force was needed to clean the main irrigation canal, a major undertaking in itself, and to begin milling after a temporary shutdown. As the Aspillagas explained later, they managed to retain enough workers to accomplish both jobs because 'we have only let go those who have paid their loan. . . ' o s Indebted peonage was, however, a double-edged sword for the Aspillagas. When they had an adequate number of workers (or a surplus) they com plained about the large sums of money that they had sunk into workers' loans. This was a particularly serious problem during periods of very low sugar prices. 64 Another problem was that some peons received loans from more than one contractor (plus the estate), sometimes using fictitious names. The chief engineer, the Englishman Thomas Colston, once even stated that some mill workers purposely ran up a debt so as to ensure themselves regular employment. 65 The estate also had to concern itself with what to do with ill or injured peons who were indebted but could not work. If these workers were expelled from the estate, the plantation lost money. But if they were retained, they occupied valuable housing and did little or no work. Twice during die early twentieth century, a period of especially low sugar prices, management chose to expell seriously ill workers, assuming that they would never be able to repay their debts in any case. Generally, however, debilitated workers simply wasted away on the plantation itself.
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There were other ways to circumvent indebted peonage. Indebted workers could receive permission from the estate or their contractors to visit neigh bouring towns or their relatives in the sierra. Furthermore, almost from the onset of enganche the Aspillagas and contractors had to contend with in debted peons fleeing from the estate. The reasons for escapes were not mysterious. Clearly, some new recruits found it difficult to adjust to the work routine and climate but workers also fled from their debts or to seek higher wages elsewhere. 67 Contractors on neighbouring estates signed on escaped peons sometimes, but not always, unaware that they were runaways. This practice made the capturing of escapees particularly difficult, as contractors were naturally reluctant to return runaways once they had advanced them money. 6 8 Cayalti attempted to prevent escapes by having peons supervised while they worked. The Aspillagas generally blamed supervisors (caporales) for escapes, although caporales typically had to supervise from 50 to 100 peons who might be spread out over a considerable area. Peons could also hide in groves of mature cane, which grew far above their heads, or in irrigation and Labour Contracting in Northern Peru, 1880-1905 313 canals, and take advantage of the lack of electric lighting to escape into the night. 0 0 Once peons had escaped from Cayalti, caporales and sometimes contractors organized search parties and local authorities, and planters were notified. Nevertheless, rival planters and contractors did not always allow caporales to search for runaways on their estates, especially if some of their peons had been recently stolen. 70 Moreover, it is difficult to judge how much assistance the Aspillagas received from public officials in capturing runaways. A letter from a contractor in Bambamarca in 1905 suggests that local officials there (including the judge) generally jailed runaways upon request until they could be taken down to the coast. However, the letter went on to complain that in recent weeks normal co-operation had not been forthcoming. 71 In 1908, an Aspillaga suggested that the family might receive greater co-operation from the Governor of Sana if it offered to pay him 50 centavos for every runaway from Cayalti he captured, which was 50 centavos less than contractors in the neighbouring Chicama Valley paid their local governor.
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It is impossible to calculate how many peons escaped from Cayalti during these years. However, it is more important to understand what impact escapes had on enganche. and the efficacy of indebted peonage. The frequency of escapes, I believe, points to three conclusions: (1) Escapes softened the effectiveness of indebted peonage but did not render it totally ineffective, especially during periods of labour shortages when the estate was likely to hold on to workers at all costs. (2) Despite escapes, labour was easy enough to acquire, given the proper incentives, so that new peons could be found to replace runaways. Therefore, the prevalence of escapes did not seriously threaten the operation of the estate. (3) Escapes were, undoubtedly, a financial drain on contractors and planters. However, in the long run, both profited from the sugar industry. 7 3
Conclusion
It is clear that market forces and capital incentives played an important role in the operation of enganche. Peons sought high wages on the coast, migrating and establishing households hundreds of miles from their homes. They even moved from one estate to another in search of higher incomes. Planters could also pull the strings on labour supply, under normal con ditions, through the allocation of money for advances to labour contractors. The offering of loans and comparatively good wages was enticement enough for many to migrate, although others agreed to work on the coast to cancel an old debt. The amount of capital planters were willing to advance to con tractors, in turn, depended largely on the price of sugar on the world market. This was the link that connected Liverpool with a tiny village in the Peruvian highlands.
It should not be forgotten, however, that deception and coercion also played a part in labour contracting. A t Cayalti, the Aspillagas did what they could to acquire a stable work force, regardless of the legal and moral impli cations. They had fewer restrictions on their actions during the years of economic and political chaos, from roughly 1873-1895, and it was easier for them to exploit the Chinese, w h o as foreigners from a weak k i n g d o m were not well protected. The Aspillagas did not have much more respect for the civil and human rights of Peruvian peons, but as the economy and state became more organized they could not rely as heavily on violence to control the work force. This did not prevent contractors, however, from tricking peons into signing contracts nor the Aspillagas from attempting to bind indebted workers to the estate.
Thus, what emerges from this analysis is a new interpretation of enganche. By paying closer attention to changes in the regional and international economies, and relating them to socio-political reality, labour contracting appears not as semi-slavery, as described by its early opponents, nor as a free market system of labour supply, as some have recently said. Rather, it clearly reflects both the demands of the marketplace and evolving methods of social and political control which did not always protect human and civil rights.
